

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

Subject: Request by Director of Naval Petroleum Reserves
for intelligence information

References: a. DNPR memorandum for DCI via CNI dated
8 October 1948, with CNO endorsement
dated 18 October 1948

b. DCI memorandum for DNPR via CNI dated
4 November 1948

1. Acting under your instructions, as a result of oral notification by the Director to you that reference b had been cancelled, the undersigned on 18 November held conversations with Commodore Greenman, Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves, for the specific purpose of ascertaining details concerning the requirement outlined in reference a. Summarized below are the findings.

2. The Commodore's objective is to obtain all available raw intelligence and intelligence information, particularly statistics on exploration, discoveries of new fields, development (number of wells drilled), and production of grade petroleum. This on a continuing basis as reports come in (primarily MA, NA, AA, State, CO, and OSO reports).

3. The purpose of making the request to CIA is to get one agency to which Commodore Greenman may look for all data, save occasional Top Secret matter.

4. The working arrangements desired are substantially as follows:


a. Information presently in CIA would be exploited by a representative from Commodore Greenman's office or of De Gailvar and MacKington, the ultimate recipient of the collected data.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Information currently coming in would be sent by CIA to Commodore Greenman's office immediately upon receipt.
 - c. Commodore Greenman would then send it on to De Golyer and MacNaughton via registered mail.
 - d. After De Golyer and MacNaughton had made use of the reports, they would destroy them and notify Commodore Greenman of that fact.
5. It would appear that at maximum, ORE participation would be to assist OCD in the selection of items to be forwarded.
6. In view of the free interchange of reports among the intelligence agencies, it would appear that the Office of Naval Intelligence would be in as good a position as CIA to give Commodore Greenman all he wants.
7. Recommendations:
- a. That the entire matter be again discussed with the Director, with a view to:
 - (1) Relieving ORE of responsibility in this matter except possibly as outline in paragraph 5 above; and
 - (2) Ascertaining why the obviously most efficient way of handling this matter by ONI is not feasible.
 - b. That in view of the great interest of the Secretary of Defense and the desire of Commodore Greenman to get a 1948 report from De Golyer and MacNaughton by April of 1949, the resolution of this matter be treated as a matter of urgency.

25X1A



CONFIDENTIAL